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Abstract 
Since the early 1990s, European integration has become differentiated integration. Treaty revisions and 
enlargements have resulted in opt-outs for countries such as Britain or Denmark, and in policy areas such 
as monetary union. Analysing under what conditions member states make use of the opportunity to opt-
out or exclude other countries from European integration, we argue that different explanations apply to 
treaty and accession negotiations respectively. Threatening to block deeper integration, member states 
with strong national identities secure differentiations in treaty reform, particularly regarding the 
integration of core state powers. In enlargement, in turn, old member states fear economic 
disadvantages and low administrative capacity and, therefore impose differentiation on poor 
newcomers. A logistic regression analysis of the use of differentiation opportunities by member and 
candidate countries from Maastricht in 1993 to the Croatian accession in 2013 lends empirical support to 
these arguments. 
Introduction2 
Since the early 1990s, European integration has become differentiated integration. This period has been 
characterized by a far-reaching extension of the European Union’s policy scope beyond the internal 
market, a progressive deepening of its competences, above all in monetary policy and justice and home 
1 Contact: thomas.winzen@eup.gess.ethz.ch; frank.schimmelfennig@eup.gess.ethz.ch.  
2 This paper builds on the EUDIFF1 database of differentiation in EU treaty law that has been assembled as part of a 
research project on “Differentiated Integration in Europe”, co-directed by Katharina Holzinger (University of 
Konstanz) and Frank Schimmelfennig (ETH Zurich), and funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the 
Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF). For their support in coding the data, we further thank Claudia 
Baumgartner, Laura Gies, Sebastian Müller, Anna Reimann, Olga Sierocinska, Mario Trost, and Dagmar 
Zakopalova.  For comments on earlier versions, we thank participants at the “Differentiated Integration” workshop 
(13-14 November 2014, University of Konstanz). 
 
 
                                                             
affairs, and by more than a doubling of its membership (from 12 to 28). The EU has continuously been 
involved in negotiations on revisions to its treaty framework and the accession of candidates for 
membership. A uniform level of integration across all member states can still be considered the standard 
and proclaimed goal of these negotiations. As a matter of fact, however, the degree of integration is 
negotiable. Consequently, differentiated integration has become a permanent and increasingly 
important feature of the political order of the EU. 
To give a few prominent examples, the British and Danish opt-outs from the single currency have been in 
place since the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). New member states, which joined the EU after the 
introduction of the euro in 1999, are generally excluded from monetary union upon accession. Although 
they are legally obliged to adopt the euro, it is in fact a matter of political choice whether or not they 
work towards meeting the conditions of convergence and apply for joining the euro area. Only seven of 
the 13 new member states, which have joined the EU since 2004, have adopted the single currency. The 
UK and Ireland have stayed out of the Schengen free-travel area since it was implemented in 1995, while 
Bulgaria and Romania have been blocked from joining since 2007. In addition, the UK and Ireland enjoy a 
flexible opt-out from the justice and home affairs policies subsumed under the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice (AFSJ), which allows them to opt in and out of legislation case by case. 
At the same time, differentiated integration is a highly uneven development. Some countries – among 
them the original six member states – have no treaty-based opt-outs at all; others – most notably 
Denmark and the UK – have many. Some member states are differentially integrated based on their 
accession treaties; others as a result of revisions to the main European treaties. Likewise, differentiation 
is strong in some policy areas but virtually absent from others (Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2014).  
This paper analyses the choice for differentiated integration in the EU. We start from the assumption 
that treaty negotiations present the participating states with opportunities to opt out or exclude other 
countries from (further) integration in a variety of policy areas and ask which factors make it more likely 
that states actually use this opportunity. Based on descriptive analyses and findings reported in an 
earlier paper (Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2014), we further assume that differentiated integration 
based on revisions of the EU’s main treaties (from Maastricht to Lisbon) follows a different logic from 
differentiated integration originating in accession treaties. Treaty revisions, in which member states 
agree on the deepening of European integration – either by integrating new policies or by making 
already integrated policies more supranational – typically produce concerns by some member states that 
European integration is moving too far. This is true in particular for the more Euro-sceptic member states 
and for the integration of core state powers. By contrast, negotiations on EU enlargement typically 
produce concerns among the old member states that some of the new entrants may not be fully ready to 
participate in integrated policies, require too much assistance, or become strong competitors on the 
internal market or for EU budgetary resources. This applies in particular to poorer new member states 
with comparatively weak administrative capacity. 
In this paper, we provide an empirical test of these propositions. Over a time period of 20 years, we 
examine the country- and policy-specific differentiation opportunities provided by EU treaty negotiations 
from Maastricht to the accession treaty with Croatia. In a logistic regression analysis, we study the 
factors that have driven new differentiations in the Treaty on European Union and its revisions, the 
accession treaties, and more policy-specific treaties such as Schengen and the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) Treaty. In line with our theoretical expectations, we find that exclusive national 
identities explain new differentiation in deepening, whereas wealth (GDP per capita) accounts for new 
differentiations in enlargement. In turn, wealth has no effect on DI in treaty revisions, and national 
identity plays no role the context of accession. Core state powers are generally more prone to 
differentiation than other policy areas but this effect is two times stronger in treaty reform than in 
enlargement. Examining the empirical fit of our parsimonious explanation, we suggest that future 
research would be particularly beneficial regarding the factors that sometimes constrain agreement on 
DI (e.g. Hvidsten and Hovi 2015), and regarding enlargement (e.g. Schimmelfennig 2014). 
Theory 
Differentiated integration is an institutional response to the increasing diversity and divisiveness of the 
EU. As the EU expands to additional countries, it is likely to have an increasingly diverse membership 
with heterogeneous preferences and capabilities. As it expands its policy scope, it is increasingly likely to 
include value-laden or redistributive policies that provoke intense conflict. Finally, as European 
integration deepens further, it triggers concerns about losses of national sovereignty and identity. 
Because both treaty revisions and accession treaties require unanimous intergovernmental agreement – 
and, in general, ratification by all member states, too – heterogeneity and conflict threaten the EU with 
deadlocked negotiations. Differentiated integration offers a solution to deadlock by allowing the 
member states to cooperate at different levels of integration that fit their preferences and capabilities. 
Exemptions and exclusions reduce heterogeneity and facilitate agreement on further integration 
(Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2014). All new European treaties or treaty revisions create opportunities 
for deadlock and thus for differentiated integration. However, revisions or extensions of the main 
treaties and new accession treaties typically constitute diverse negotiation contexts with different 
drivers and actors of differentiated integration. 
Revisions of the main treaties are about the deepening of European integration. Typically, they expand 
the policy scope of the EU by removing additional policies from the exclusive competence of the member 
states, or they increase the level of centralization of already integrated policies by strengthening the 
pooling and delegation of policymaking, e.g. by moving from unanimous to majority voting, increasing 
the powers of the European Parliament, or delegating competences to the Commission and other 
supranational agencies.3 Mostly, member state governments negotiate and decide on deepening on the 
basis of efficiency-oriented preferences. Majority voting facilitates decision-making, and delegation 
improves policy coordination and the credibility of member state commitments (Moravcsik 1998). In 
addition, however, some member states may have principled objections to transferring powers to the EU 
for fear of hollowing out national sovereignty. Such principled objections make it harder to reach 
intergovernmental agreement; they are also prone to triggering popular opposition to integration, which 
ties the hands of government in the negotiation process or causes domestic ratification to fail. 
The likelihood that such principled sovereignty concerns arise varies across policies and member states. 
As Stanley Hoffmann (1966) pointed out, integration in areas of “high politics” should yield higher 
autonomy costs compared to integration in “low politics”. Taking Hoffmann’s distinction as a point of 
departure, Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2014:10) define “core state powers” (such a state’s army, police 
and justice system, currency, or public administration) as those functions and policies that have 
particularly strong “institutional significance for state building” and are thus closely linked to 
sovereignty. In addition, sovereignty concerns can be assumed to be particularly salient in the more 
Euro-sceptic member states. If popular Euro-scepticism and national identities are strong, the transfer of 
national competences to the EU increases the chance that European integration becomes an issue of 
“identity politics” (Hooghe and Marks 2008), strengthens Euro-sceptic parties, and leads to the defeat of 
treaty revisions in domestic ratification. According to these considerations, both the integration of core 
state powers and the strength of national identities increase opposition to treaty revisions 
independently. In addition, both factors may reinforce each other: when core state powers are on the 
agenda for integration, the more Euro-sceptic countries are the most likely candidates for differentiated 
integration.  
3 See Schmitter (1969) and Börzel (2005) on definitions and measurements of level and scope. 
                                                             
The opponents of further deepening are in a particularly strong bargaining position during negotiations 
on treaty revisions. They are the status quo powers that can block treaty revisions requiring unanimous 
agreement. This leaves member states desiring to move beyond what the opponents deem acceptable 
with two options. They can either offer them an opt-out from the deepening provisions of the treaty 
revision; or they can conclude an intergovernmental treaty outside the European treaty framework. We 
see examples for both options in the history of EU treaty-making. The British and Danish opt-outs from 
monetary union in the Treaty of Maastricht are the most prominent examples of the first option; the 
1985 Schengen Agreement, which was only incorporated into the main treaties at Amsterdam in 1997, 
was the prototypical case of differentiated integration via separate treaty-making. Both cases lead to 
differentiated integration, in which a group of member states is exempted from areas of further 
deepening. This brings us to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: In treaty revisions, opportunities for differentiated integration are more likely to be used in 
policies related to core state powers and by member states with stronger national identities. 
Accession treaties are about the widening of European integration. They expand the membership of the 
EU and extend the integrated policies to additional state territories. In principle, the acquis 
communautaire is supposed to be valid and applied in new member states on the first day of 
membership. The EU and the candidates may, however, agree on transitional arrangements. They 
determine a period of time, during which particular rules or policies do not apply.  
Accession treaties do not involve any deepening for the old member states and therefore do not trigger 
the sovereignty concerns typical for treaty revisions. Nonmember states may, of course, have 
reservations against the depth of sovereignty pooling and delegation entailed by membership but they 
know that the acquis communautaire is non-negotiable – except for brief transition periods, which would 
not help in the case of principled opposition to the EU’s level of deepening. Therefore they would 
probably refrain from applying for membership altogether if the level of EU integration was 
unacceptable to them.  
By contrast, widening generates concerns about efficiency and redistribution among the old member 
states. Old member states, or powerful interest groups in these states, fear economic and financial 
losses as a result of market integration with the new member states (e.g. resulting from the opening up 
of labour markets), the redistribution of EU funds (e.g. in agriculture or regional policy), or weak 
implementation capacity (e.g. by expanding the Schengen regime before effective border controls are in 
place). New member states may in turn be concerned about pressures on domestic producers resulting 
from the opening up of their markets and losing competitiveness due to the obligation of implementing 
demanding regulatory rules.  
They are, however, normally in a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis the EU. Their markets are much 
smaller than the internal market, and bilateral trade with the EU is normally much more important to 
them than it is to the EU. As a consequence, candidate countries have more to gain from EU membership 
than the EU has to gain from accession of the candidate country, and candidate countries in the vicinity 
of the EU usually do not have credible outside options. This is especially true of the Central and Eastern 
European countries that have made up the bulk of applicants to EU membership in the past two decades 
(Moravcsik and Vachudova 2005). Under these circumstances, the old member states are generally able 
to decide on the terms of the transitional arrangements with new member states. Whereas the old 
member states have always granted new member states temporary exemptions from the obligations of 
membership to facilitate their adaptation to market pressures and regulatory obligations (such as in the 
area of environmental standards) or to forestall popular fears and concerns (e.g. about foreigners buying 
land and holiday homes on a massive scale), they have also been able to exclude them temporarily from 
policies and rights in order to placate the most enlargement-sceptical member states or alleviate popular 
concerns in their own countries (Plümper and Schneider 2007; Schneider 2009). Examples are 
restrictions to the free movement of labour for the new member states, the phasing in of agricultural 
subsidies, and initial exclusion of new member states from Schengen and the monetary union in Eastern 
enlargement. 
Differentiated integration in accession treaties is likely to affect poorer new member states more 
strongly than wealthier new member states. First, poorer candidates generate particularly strong 
efficiency and redistribution concerns in the older member states. They will likely be net recipients of the 
EU budget, have problems of governance quality and capacity, and produce migratory pressure. These 
concerns strengthen the old member states’ interest in excluding them from some of the rights and 
benefits of membership. Second, they have weaker bargaining power than wealthier candidates because 
they are less attractive candidates, are more dependent on the benefits of membership, and are less 
likely to do well outside the EU. For these reasons, the old member states are not only more interested 
in but also more capable of imposing differentiated integration on them. As efficiency and redistribution 
concerns cut across the policy areas of the EU, we do not expect any systematic variation between core 
state powers and non-core state powers for differentiated integration originating in accession treaties. 
This brings us to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: In accession treaties, opportunities for differentiated integration are more likely to be used 
in the case of poorer new member states. 
Research design and data 
Our research design focuses on “differentiation opportunities”. In order to identify these opportunities 
as precisely as possible, we first list all treaty revisions and accession treaties since 1990, summarised in 
Table 1. Before the 1990s, differentiated integration was close to non-existent in European integration 
(Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2014). Each treaty revision and accession treaty covers a number of policy 
areas, each of which constitutes an opportunity for a differentiation for any country involved in the 
negotiations. We demarcate policy areas based on the sections of EU treaties, which EU policy-makers 
also use to structure treaty revisions and accession negotiations (for an overview, see Table A1 in the 
appendix). Technically speaking, our unit of analysis, thus, is the “treaty-policy-country” combination. 
And our outcome of interest is the likelihood that a given country obtains a differentiation from a given 
policy area during the negotiations of a given treaty. 
Let us add clarifications. First, the number of countries that participates in treaty negotiations varies. In 
treaty revisions, it increases over time as more countries join the Union (cf. Table 1). Thus, 27 states 
negotiated over each policy area covered by the Lisbon Treaty, in contrast to twelve at the Maastricht 
intergovernmental conference. In turn, each accession treaty generates differentiation opportunities 
only for the set of countries that joins at that particular point in time. For instance, Austria, Finland, or 
Sweden could obtain accession-related differentiations only in 1995, not in any later enlargement. 
Table 1. Treaties generating differentiation opportunities 
Treaty revisions and member states 
at the time of negotiation 
Accession treaties 
Maastricht Treaty (1993) 
Schengen Treaty (1995) 
Amsterdam Treaty (1999) 
Nice Treaty (2003) 
Prum Convention (2006) 
Lisbon Treaty (2010) 
ESM Treaty (2012) 
TSCG (2013) 
12 
12 
15 
15 
25 
27 
27 
27 
Austria, Finland, Sweden (1995) 
8 CEECs, Cyprus, Malta (2004) 
Bulgaria, Romania (2007) 
Croatia (2013) 
Note: ESM: European Stability Mechanism. TSCG: Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance. CEECs: Central and Eastern 
European countries. In parentheses: year of entry into force. 
 
Second, the set of policy areas that is being negotiated varies. This is important since countries cannot 
obtain differential arrangements in matters that are not even discussed. Simply speaking, negotiating the 
ESM Treaty does not create an opportunity to opt-out of European transport policy. One reason for 
variation in policy areas is growth over time with every treaty revision. The number of policy areas with 
EU involvement has grown from 28 at the time of Maastricht to 37 at the time of the Lisbon Treaty. Thus, 
the Lisbon negotiations produced more opportunities than the ones in Maastricht. Similarly, late joiners 
such as Croatia have more enlargement-based differentiation opportunities than early joiners, simply 
because more policy areas are being negotiated at the time of accession. 
There is one more reason for variation in the set of negotiated policy areas: Treaty revisions do not 
necessarily deal with every last one of the EU’s competences. Accession treaties cover the entire body of 
EU law, but treaty revisions may bracket some domains. Policy-specific treaties such as the ESM Treaty 
consist of only one policy area. Moreover, whereas the Maastricht and Lisbon negotiations encompassed 
nearly all of the EU’s engagements, the Amsterdam and Nice conferences were narrower. Thus, we 
consulted primary documents and Börzel’s (2005) data on the reform of decision-making procedures to 
identify what areas were in fact negotiated (for an overview, see Table A2). 
Finally, we have to identify whether a country does or does not realise a differentiation opportunity. A 
differentiation is a legal exemption from the validity of the rules that govern a policy area. For instance, 
Britain obtained a differentiation from monetary policy in the Treaty of Maastricht, whereas Germany 
did not. We rely on an existing dataset that tells us in detail whether any of the member states is 
exempted from any EU treaty rules in a policy area at any point in time (for a more detailed discussion of 
these data, see Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2014).4 Whenever a country obtains new exemptions in a 
given treaty and policy area, we say that it realised its differentiation opportunity. 
Our measure of differentiations is binary: either an opportunity is realised or not. We acknowledge that, 
in theory, it makes sense to think that differentiation in one policy area, say monetary policy, might be 
more or less important or encompassing than in another, say the free movement of persons. Yet, as we 
explain elsewhere, it has proven hard to measure such gradation in differentiation in any way that does 
not generate more problems than it solves (Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2014). Thus, we only capture 
whether new differentiations emerge or not for a country in a given area and treaty. We are also able to 
control for whether a country already had differentiations in place when an opportunity to acquire new 
ones arises. 
4  The EUDIFF1 dataset covers treaty-based differentiation from 1952 to 2013 in the legally binding parties of EU 
treaties (main parts, protocols and annexes. The dataset has article-years as its unit of observation. For more 
information on the dataset, see Schimmelfennig and Winzen (2014). 
                                                             
Table 2. Differentiations and differentiation opportunities 
 Differentiation opportunities 
 Treaty revision  Accession 
No differentiation 1581 332 
New differentiation 73 88 
Total 1654 420 
 
Let us turn to the three main explanatory variables: core state powers, national identity, and wealth. 
Following Genschel and Jachtenfuchs’ (2014) definition discussed earlier, we manually code what of the 
EU’s policy areas qualify as core state powers, as shown in Table A1. We cannot classify a small number 
of policy areas, none of which has seen a single differentiation. To measure the strength of national 
identity, we rely on the widely used Eurobarometer item that asks respondents whether they feel 
“exclusively national” rather than “national and European”, “European and national” or “European only” 
(e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2005). The strength of national identity is the percentage of respondents feeling 
“exclusively national”. We measure identity using surveys immediately prior to the differentiation 
opportunity. In the case of some enlargements, this is not possible because countries are included in the 
Eurobarometer only upon accession – so we use the first survey after accession. In the case of the Lisbon 
Treaty, we use two surveys from immediately before the signature of the Constitutional Treaty and one 
from 2010 because the relevant question was not asked in between.5 Table A3 lists the used surveys. 
Finally, we measure wealth in the year prior to a differentiation opportunity as GDP/capita in 2005 
constant United States (US) Dollars based on data from the World Bank. 
Description of differentiations and differentiation opportunities 
A first look at the data highlights that differentiation is a rather rare phenomenon. As Table 2 shows, the 
member states used only 73 of the 1654 opportunities to opt out of treaty revisions. New member 
states, however, have had to accept differential treatment more frequently, namely in 88 out of 420 
opportunities. Furthermore, Figure 1 shows that there is no general trend in European integration for 
members to use more of their opportunities to opt-out. Rather they used around two percent at 
Maastricht and only marginally more at the time of the Lisbon Treaty. It is clear, however, that the 
policy-specific treaties in the areas of justice and home affairs as well as economic and monetary union 
strongly raise the share of used differentiation opportunities. In light of our theoretical arguments, this is 
plausible because the only areas at stake in the negotiations of these treaties are core state powers in 
5 Note that the Lisbon Treaty took over most of the substantive agreements made in the Constitutional Treaty. 
Thus, our measurement, even if taken several years before the Lisbon Treaty, should nonetheless capture the 
conditions under which policy-makers negotiated.  
                                                             
contrast to a broader array of policies in other intergovernmental conferences. In accession treaties, in 
turn, we see that the use of possibilities for opt outs has clearly been on the rise. The accession of 
wealthy Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 resulted in little differentiated integration compared to any 
of the following enlargements of the Union towards the East. The Croatian accession has so far given rise 
to most differential legal arrangements, covering more than 25 per cent of the EU’s policy portfolio.  
Again, from a theoretical perspective, this trend is not surprising, as one would expect stronger 
distributional conflicts and capacity problems in the successive Eastern enlargements compared to the 
1995 cohort (cf. Schimmelfennig 2014). 
Figure 1. The use of differentiation opportunities 
a) Treaty revisions b) Accession treaties 
 
 
 
 
 
Turning to the relationship between differentiation and our explanatory variables, we first note signs of a 
core state power effect (see also Figure A1). Of the 73 differentiations in treaty revisions, 69 fall within 
policy areas at the heart of national sovereignty. With very few exceptions, differentiation does not exist 
outside core state powers. The picture is more balanced in accession treaties. Of the 88 differentiations, 
54 are in “normal” policy areas and 34 in core state powers. Nonetheless, the share of used 
opportunities for differentiation is higher in core state powers, even in the case of enlargements (not 
shown, see Figure A1). In light of our hypotheses, the core state power effect in treaty revisions is 
expected. It is also plausible that this effect should be less pronounced in accession treaties – we had, 
however, anticipated to find no effect at all in the enlargement context, whereas there might in fact be a 
weak one. 
In Figure 2, we see first evidence of the theoretically expected relationships between differentiation, 
identity and wealth. First, in treaty revisions, there is a clear tendency for countries with strong national 
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identities to use more of their differentiation opportunities than their more “cosmopolitan” 
counterparts.  In contrast, whether or not a country has a strong national identity at the time it joins the 
EU has no bearing on how many differentiations it obtains. This pattern is in line with the idea that 
nationally-oriented countries use their bargaining power in treaty reforms to secure differential 
treatment, whereas at accession such countries, even if they seek differentiations, are not in a 
sufficiently strong position to do likewise. Second, the patterns are less clear-cut in the case of wealth. In 
line with expectations, rich countries realise fewer differentiation opportunities when they join the EU 
than poor countries, which suffer the consequences of the old members’ distributional and efficiency 
concerns. Unexpectedly, though, the same pattern appears to exist in treaty revisions: poor countries do 
not only obtain DI at accession but also in treaty revisions. Having said this, one should be aware that 
this relationship is strongly driven by the post-2004 Eastern accession countries, whose treaty-based 
differentiations lie in the same areas from which they were excluded when they joined the Union. Thus, 
we should control for ongoing differentiations before we draw conclusions. 
Figure 2. Differentiations, identity and wealth in treaty revisions and accession treaties 
a) Treaty revision 
  
b) Accession treaties 
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Logistic regression analysis 
We investigate the data further, presenting two logistic regression models in Table 3, one for the use of 
differentiation opportunities in treaty revisions and one for their use in accession treaties. These models 
include our variables of interest: identity, wealth and core state powers. In the analysis of treaty 
revisions, we additionally control for ongoing differentiations that countries may have acquired in earlier 
years. We also insert a dummy variable that identifies the policy-specific treaties in justice and home 
affairs and economic and monetary union. As we have seen, these treaties have led to more 
differentiation than the other treaties. Indeed, the inability of the member states to achieve agreement 
on revising the main treaties gave rise to the conclusion of policy-specific treaties in the first place. In 
principle, this is what we would expect given the salience of the negotiated policies. However, we want 
to ascertain that our results particularly regarding the core state power variable do not merely capture 
the difference between comprehensive and policy-specific treaty revisions. These two additional control 
variables, ongoing differentiations and policy-specific treaties, are not applicable in the analysis of 
accession treaties: There are no policy-specific accession treaties and new members cannot have 
obtained opt-outs in earlier years. 
Table 3. Models of the likelihood that countries use differentiation opportunities 
 1) Treaty revisions 2) Accession treaties 
Identity 0.05 (0.02)* 0.00 (0.00) 
Wealth 0.00 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01)* 
Core state power 2.44 (0.61)* 0.92 (0.1)* 
Policy-specific treaty 3.19 (0.36)*  
Ongoing differentiation 3.14 (0.6)*  
Constant -8.56 (0.97* -1.21 (0.21)* 
N 1654 420 
Log-pseudolikelihood -129.21 -207.51 
Note: * p<0.05. Logistic regression models with country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Let us first examine the direction and statistical significance of the estimated effects before turning to 
their substantial relevance. In line with the expectations, we find that national identity significantly 
enhances the likelihood of a country obtaining a differentiation in treaty revisions but not so in accession 
treaties. Supporting our hypothesis further, a country’s wealth has no impact on DI in treaty revisions. 
Yet, in the enlargement context, richer countries have to accept fewer differential arrangements than 
poor countries. As the previous section already indicated, differentiations are more likely to be in core 
state powers than other policy areas, both in treaty revisions and enlargements – thus, matching our 
expectations only partly. A possible reason is that old member states oppose the participation of 
accession countries in core state powers not only because of capacity concerns, that is, the ability of 
newcomers to comply with EU requirements such as the management of Schengen borders. Old member 
states might additionally be particularly reluctant to welcome new members in areas that they deem 
essential for their national sovereignty and identity. Finally, and unsurprisingly, policy-specific treaties 
generate more differentiated integration than the other treaties. Furthermore, countries that already 
have differentiations are likely to acquire follow-up opt-outs when a policy area comes up for 
negotiations again. 
Table 4. Explanatory variables and the probability of differentiation 
 Predicted probability: new differentiation  
 Variable absent Variable present Change 
Core state power 
     Treaty revision 
     Accession treaty* 
 
0.015 (0.006-0.024) 
0.169 (0.156-0.183) 
 
0.0649 (0.048-0.082) 
0.337 (0.309-0.365) 
 
4.3-fold increase 
2-fold increase 
Ongoing differentiation 0.024 (0.013-0.036) 0.164 (0.126-0.202) 6.8-fold increase 
Policy-specific treaty 0.023 (0.016-0.031) 0.169 (0.095-0.244) 7.3-fold increase 
Note: Cell entries are predicted probabilities based on the results shown in Table 3. 95 percent confidence intervals are in 
parentheses. *These predicted probabilities are based on model 2 in Table 3, whereas the other cell entries are based on model 
1. 
 
How substantial are these effects? Table 4 shows changes in the predicted probability that a country 
realises a differentiation opportunity, given the presence or absence of all binary explanatory variables.6 
In treaty revisions, an opt-out is four times more likely in core state powers compared to other policy 
areas. In accession treaties, the core state power effect is about half the size. Ongoing differentiations 
and policy-specific treaties raise the probability of differentiations even more strongly, by about a factor 
of seven. Given that differentiation is generally a rather rare phenomenon, particularly in treaty 
revisions, these are all substantially important effects. Figure 3 shows the effects of our continuous 
explanatory variables, identity and wealth. In treaty revisions, moving from the least to the most 
nationally-minded countries that we actually observe in our data, the probability of a new differentiation 
increases by a factor of about four from 2.5 percent to around ten percent. Estimating this effect, we 
hold the core state power variable at one. Otherwise, changes in identity also increase the probability of 
differentiation, but the absolute level remains extremely low – effectively zero.7 This corresponds to 
what we have seen earlier in the data: in treaty revisions, differentiations scarcely exist outside core 
state powers. Turning to accession treaties, moving from richer to poorer countries raises the chance of 
6 All predicted probabilities presented in the following were calculated using STATA’s “margins” command. 
7 For the mechanisms underlying this type of interaction in logistic regression models, see Berry (2010). 
                                                             
the EU agreeing on differentiated integration by about ten percent. Finally, there are no discernible 
wealth effects on treaty revisions, nor identity effects on enlargement. 
Figure 3. The effects of identity and wealth on differentiation in treaty revisions and accession treaties 
a) Treaty revisions 
  
Core state power set to 1, and average over all values of the other variables 
 
 
b) Accession treaties 
  
Average effect over all values of other variables. 
Note: Predicted probabilities based on the results of the models presented in Table 3. 
 
Let us clarify additional questions one could ask about these results. One issue is whether the results are 
robust to including country- or cohort-effects. In the case of treaty revisions, we would expect that the 
identity variable mainly captures differences between countries – there is only limited variation in the 
strength of national identity of countries over time. The core state power effect, however, should not 
depend on differences between countries but policies. Testing these suspicions well is problematic 
because many countries and policy areas predict the absence of differentiation perfectly and, thus, we 
lose the corresponding dummy variables and observations in our robustness checks (not shown here). 
Tentatively, however, we find that the core state power variable has no effect with policy area dummies 
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in the model, and the identity variable has no effect with country dummies included. Turning to 
accession treaties, the obvious hunch arising from earlier figures is that the wealth effect mainly reflects 
differences between enlargement cohorts. Furthermore, recent studies argue that norms of equal 
treatment have prevented the EU from treating candidates that join at the same time too differently 
(Schimmelfennig 2014). Robustness tests also underline this suspicion. Inserting cohort dummy variables 
in the model, the wealth effect disappears. 
Another question is how well our models, reflecting a parsimonious theoretical argument with few 
explanatory factors, accounts for the use of differentiation opportunities in treaty revisions and 
enlargements. One way to answer this question is to ask how well the models classify the outcomes of 
each differentiation opportunity. In treaty revisions, the observed share of DI in our data is 4.4 percent. 
Let us say that our model should at least predict a higher probability than that for each case that actually 
resulted in a differentiation. By that standard, we classify 63 of the 73 positive cases correctly. However, 
this comes at the cost of mistakenly classifying 95 cases as differentiated. In other words, the model 
performs well but expects more differentiation than there actually is. We proceed in a similar fashion 
with our model for accession treaties. Here we are able to correctly classify 34 of the 88 differentiation 
cases, and we mistakenly classify 66 cases as positive. Overall, the enlargement model appears to leave 
more open questions, having not only false-positive but also a substantial number of false-negative 
cases. 
We learn from this assessment of explanatory power that our explanatory factors add notably to our 
understanding of the conditions under which the EU opts for differentiation. However, there are also 
open questions remaining. First, studies of differentiated integration in treaty revisions and enlargement 
should still become better in telling when and why opt-outs do not occur, given that the model proposed 
here has a particular weakness regarding false positives (for an example of a study moving in this 
direction, see Hvidsten and Hovi 2015). Second, in the study of accession treaties, there is still ample 
room to improve predicting positive cases of differentiation. One plausible starting point for further 
research would be to distinguish policy areas more effectively, given that the core state power variable 
in our analysis has a weaker effect in the enlargement context compared to treaty revisions (cf. Kölliker 
2001). Another line of attack might be to study more precisely under what conditions new countries are 
being excluded by old members with superior bargaining power, and under what conditions the Union is 
willing to afford preferential treatment to newcomers in dire economic situations (Schimmelfennig 
2014). 
Conclusion 
Differentiated integration has become a standard and durable feature of EU treaty-making. Both treaty 
revisions and accession treaties regularly contain provisions granting policy-specific opt-outs and 
exemptions to some countries and excluding others from full integration into the EU’s policies. In this 
paper, we analysed why some countries and policies are more strongly characterized by differentiated 
integration than others. 
Our analysis started from the assumption that differentiated integration responds to increasing 
heterogeneity of preferences and capabilities resulting from the expansion of the EU to additional policy 
areas, higher levels of centralization, and new member states. We also built on earlier descriptive work 
suggesting that deepening and widening constitute different contexts of differentiated integration, 
which require different explanations. In the case of deepening, the more Euro-sceptic countries are 
concerned about the EU undermining national sovereignty. Because of their bargaining power as 
defenders of the institutional status quo, these countries are able to achieve opt-outs from undesired 
deepening. In line with this reasoning, our analysis found that differentiation opportunities provided by 
negotiations on treaty revisions are, indeed, more likely to be realized in policy areas related to core 
state powers and by member states with a  more nationalist population. By contrast, in the context of 
widening, superior bargaining power rests with the old member states. They are concerned about losses 
resulting from inefficiency, competition, and redistribution due enlargement. By showing that poorer 
new member states, which are likely to suffer from weak governance capacity, provide low-cost labour, 
and become net recipients of the EU budget, are more affected by the transitional differentiation 
arrangements of accession treaties, our analysis found support for this conjecture, too. In addition, the 
assumption of two qualitatively different contexts of differentiated integration is corroborated by the 
fact that identity does not account for differentiation in accession treaties and wealth does not explain 
differentiation in treaty revisions. 
By focusing on three factors – identity, wealth, and core state powers – the paper offers a parsimonious 
explanation of differentiated integration. Yet our models tend to predict more differentiation than 
actually occurs. This suggests that more attention needs to be paid to factors that dampen or constrain 
differentiated integration. In addition, future research should take into account that differentiated 
integration is not only regulated in EU treaties but can also result from EU secondary law. For a full 
assessment of differentiated integration, we need to know more about exemptions in EU regulations and 
directives – and whether they simply follow primary-law differentiation or differ in terms of the policies 
and countries affected. 
The explanation of differentiated integration put forward in this paper suggests that differentiation will 
continue to characterize treaty-making in the EU. First of all, existing differentiations tend to persist and 
even produce more differentiation in later treaty negotiations. Second, future enlargements are most 
likely to integrate the relatively poor countries of the Western Balkans. Already the accession treaty with 
Croatia exhibited a record number of differentiations. Finally, exclusive national identities show no 
tendency of diminishing, and any future treaty revision is likely to affect core state powers. 
  
Appendix 
 
Table A1. Policy areas and core state powers 
Policy area Core state power (1=yes; 0=No) 
Principles . 
Institutional provisions . 
Overseas territories . 
Financial provisions . 
General, final provisions . 
Taxation 1 
Monetary policy 1 
Visa, Asylum, Migration 1 
Foreign and security policy 1 
JHA pillar of TEU & PJCCM 1 
Schengen 1 
Administrative cooperation 1 
Charter of Fundamental Rights 1 
Pruem 1 
ESM Treaty 1 
TSCG 1 
Free movement (goods) 0 
Agriculture 0 
Free movement (workers) 0 
Freedom of establishment 0 
Free movement (services) 0 
Free movement (capital) 0 
Competition 0 
Approximation of laws 0 
Economic policy 0 
Social policy 0 
Public health 0 
Consumer protection 0 
Trans-European networks 0 
Industry 0 
Economic and social cohesion 0 
Research and Technology 0 
Environment 0 
Development cooperation 0 
Transport 0 
Employment 0 
Civil protection 0 
Energy 0 
Tourism 0 
 
Table A2. Policy areas covered and negotiated in revisions of the EU founding treaties 
 SEA Maastricht  Amsterdam  Nice  Lisbon  
All policy areas Coverage Coverage Negotiated Coverage Negotiated Coverage Negotiated Coverage Negotiated 
Principles 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Free movement (goods) 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Agriculture 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Free movement (workers) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Freedom of establishment 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Free movement (services) 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
Free movement (capital) 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
Competition 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Taxation 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Approximation of laws 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Economic policy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Monetary policy  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Social policy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Public health  1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Consumer protection  1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Trans-European networks  1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
Industry  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Economic and social cohesion 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Research and Technology 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Environment 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Development cooperation  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Visa, Asylum, Migration     1 1 1 1 1 1 
Institutional provisions 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Foreign and security policy  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
JHA pillar of TEU & PJCCM  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Overseas territories 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Financial provisions 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
General, final provisions 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Schengen     1 1 1 0 1 1 
Transport 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Employment     1 1 1 1 1 0 
Civil protection           1 1 
Administrative cooperation           1 1 
Charter of Fundamental Rights           1 1 
Energy           1 1 
Tourism           1 1 
Prum Convention           1 0 
Note: SEA: Single European Act. Sources: For Maastricht: European Commission (1991a, 1991b). For Amsterdam: European Parliament (1997). For Nice: Conference of the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2000). For Lisbon: Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2003, 
2007). ESM Treaty and TSCG omitted because they enter into force only after Lisbon. 
Table A3. Eurobarometer surveys used to measure national identity 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: ENL: Enlargement Treaty.  
 
  
Treaty Surveys 
Maastricht 1993 April 1992 
Schengen 1995 November 1993, December 1994 
ENL 1995 June 1995 
Amsterdam 1999 April 1997, May 1998, November 1998 
Nice 2003 January 2001, November 2001, November 2003 
ENL 2004 October 2004 
Prüm 2006 October 2005 
ENL 2007 October 2005 
Lisbon 2010 October 2004, October 2005, June 2010 
ESM 2012 December 2011 
TSCG 2013 November/December 2012 
ENL 2013 November/December 2012, 2013 (no month available) 
Figure A1. Differentiation in core state powers and other policy areas compared 
a) Treaty revisions 
 
 
b) Accession treaties 
 
Note: Country abbreviations are official EU abbreviations. 
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